India
has wilted under pressure from the U.S. and agreed to accept conditionalities
that were not part of the G-33 proposal. The text of the agreed draft can
be accessed below (see section WT/ MIN 913)/ W / 10 - Public Stockholding for
Food Security Purposes):
(At the WTO Ministerial, Nusa Dua, Bali)
The text:
and the various parts to the
declaration:
What India has traded away:
1. Anand Sharma had unambiguously stated that the
"peace clause" should be in place till such time that a permanent
solution is found. The word "interim" that he had used IS IN the text
(a clear victory), but in what is being described by the WTO Secretariat as
"constructive ambiguity" the US position that it should be only for
four years also finds its place (Para 1) in the text by adding, "for adoption
by the 11th Ministerial Conference" (there is a WTO Ministerial once every
two years and Bali was the 9th Ministerial. (Some experts though are
interpreting it as being in India's favour since "interim" can be
interpreted as holding on till a permanent settlement is found irrespective of
the reference to the 11th Ministerial).
2. While India (G-33 draft) had demanded that no
member country can drag a member state to the dispute settlement mechanism,
till a permanent settlement is found under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
and the Agreement on Subsisdies and Countervailing Measure (ASCM), only the AoA
is mentioned in Para 2. which means that member states can still drag India
India to the dispute settlement process under ASCM. The language has also been
whittled down and instead of "shall not" replaced with "shall
refrain from", which means this guarantee is not secure even under the
AoA.
3. Most disturbingly, this agreement is (Para 2)
only, "in pursuance of public stockholding programmes for food security
purposes existing as of date". This has the following implications
(a) Minimum Support Price Mechanism cannot be
introduced for crops other than those already provided for.
(b) The quantity of foodgrains procured under the
MSP cannot be increased beyond the procurement as of date which would threaten
the NFSA in the near future.
(c) Pulses, cooking oil and other foods (other than
rice, wheat or millets specified in the NFSA) CAN NO longer be introduced in
the PDS either by the Government of India or the State Governments if they are
not being provided now. Future
(d) Governments CANNOT increase the entitlements of
foodgrains guaranteed under the NFSA which has been notified. For instance,
Chhattisgarh, amongst other states, provides 35 kgs per households but no other
state which is now providing 20 kgs or 25 kgs can increase the quantity to 35
kgs.
(e) This may also be interpreted to mean that
Government of India or the State Governments cannot increase the price of
the MSP from beyond what has been specified now for the next four years.
4. India will now be subject to ONEROUS DATA
requirements that have been made mandatory in the agreed text. This was there
in the US/ EU text but not in the G-33 proposal which means that India has
accepted to provide details of all holdings in procurement by both States and
Government of India.
5. India will also now have to notify that they
have been exceeding the de minimis level (10% of agricultural production as the
permissible subsidy for developing countries). Para 3 (a)
6. Para (4) is one of the most problematic
proposition for India which has made its way from the US/ EU draft, "shall
ensure that stocks procured under such programmes do not distort trade or
adversely affect the food security of other members" This leaves open to
interpretation that the entire MSP mechanism that is in place for decades and
India can be dragged to the dispute settlement mechanism by the US alleging
that the entire MSP mechanism distrorts trade. So can Pakistan alleging that
India's rice exports is distorting trade.
7. This also means that even with the most
generous interpretation of this agreement, India will still have to continue
negotiations for the next four years till a permanent settlement is done and we
have to continue to agree to further concessions to the US/ EU while this is
being negotiated.
8. In Bali, the African Group, many members of the
G-33 and LAC are very upset with India for having bilaterally with the US a
text, whereas till this morning, they were seeking the support of all the
countries for the G-33 and Indian position. Anand Sharma had taken a strident
note till last night, and raised the hopes of most developing countries that
India would not buckle to pressure from the US/ EU. Today his credibility and
that of India is severely eroded.
As is evident, what is contained in the agreed text
is a big climbdown from what had been stated by Anand Sharma in his strongly
worded statement. We have put at stake not just the interests of 650 million
Indian farmers but also every single one of the 820 entitlement holders under
the NFSA.
Anuradha Talwar & Biraj Patnaik (Right to Food
Campaign)]